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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of
the Utah Industrial Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND OF AGENCY
This is a Petition

For

Review

of

an Order

of the

Utah

Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether or not the Industrial Commission erred
by ignoring competent, reliable and credible
evidence
of
the
industrial
cause
of
Applicant's
accident
and
by
finding
no
industrial accident occurred.

The standard of review is the "substantial evidence" standard.
(See Willardson vs. Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah
App. 1993); King vs. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285
(Utah App. 1993)).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-86 states as follows:

"The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review,
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any
order."
STATEMENT OF CASE
On February 3, 1994, Petitioner filed an Industrial Disease
and Accident Claim with the Industrial Commission.
was

claiming

that

her

on-the-job
2

activities,

The Petitioner
which

included

standing to watch a moving conveyor belt for approximately 11 hours
caused her to faint and sustain a concussion and head injury.
Defendants claim that Petitioner's recent bout with bronchitis
and inner ear infection caused her to faint and hit her head on the
floor and thus, denied her claim.
The medical records indicate that Petitioner had been awake
for approximately 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident.
The Petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Colver reported that the
Petitioner's fainting was probably due to a generalized weakness
and working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of
bronchitis.

Dr. Colver goes on to indicate that the Petitioner's

fainting may also have had some labyrinthitis with some vertigo
which could have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor
belt.
On or about October 12, 1994, the Administrative Law Judge
found that Petitioner's industrial accident was not a result of her
work activities.

However, in so doing, he ignored competent,

credible evidence that Petitioner's work activities and conditions
aggravated her internal infirmities, causing an accident.

On or

about February 17, 1995, the Industrial Commission affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's decision, failing to give adequate
weight to a clarifying letter from Dr. Colver dated March 21, 1994,
wherein, he

stated

that

Petitioner's
3

physical

condition

was

aggravated by working too hard and being on her feet which could
have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor belt. However,
the Industrial Commission referred to his opinion as "conjecture".
The

Industrial

Commission

also

failed

to

give adequate

consideration to the Petitioner's emergency room physician, Dr.
Egbert, who's report indicates that considering the nature of the
Petitioner's work he believed that the most likely the cause of her
passing out was motion sickness due to the watching of the conveyor
belt going past her.

However, the Industrial Commission referred

to his opinion as "conjecture".
The

Industrial

Commission

also

failed

to

give

adequate

consideration to the Summary of Medical Records submitted by Dr.
Clark.

Dr. Clark specifically states that there is a medically

demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial accident
and the problems for which Petitioner was treated.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
At the time of the accident, the Applicant was 75 years old
and had been working for Stouffer Foods for only 3 days. The shift
that she had been working, and was working at the time of the
accident, began at 3:00 p.m. and was to end at 11:00 p.m.

At the

time of Applicant's injury she had been getting less sleep than
normal because her sleep pattern had been disturbed by the new job.
She had recently suffered a cough without fever, chills, sweats and
4

a sore throat, from which she was recovering.
accident,

Applicant

had

completed

her

At the time of the

shift

and

was

working

overtime.
The

Applicant's

duties

consisted

of

standing

next

to

a

conveyor belt which transported frozen food and watching the boxes
as they came down the conveyor belt.

If any of the boxes needed to

be

so.

readjusted, Applicant

would

do

On

the

night

of

the

industrial accident, Applicant had a meal break from 7:30 p.m. to
8:30 p.m. in the cafeteria.

Through-out her 8 hour shift and the

overtime, the Applicant had been standing.

Sometime shortly after

12:13 a.m., during the overtime shift, the Applicant looked up at
the ceiling lights and then at the boxes as they moved along the
conveyor belt and began to feel light headed.

Applicant testified

that she did not feel ill or faint. From that point on, the
Applicant had no recollection of what happened.

Sometime soon

thereafter, Applicant fell backwards hitting her head on the tile
floor.

The Applicant was placed in a stretcher and transported to

Mountain View Hospital in Payson, Utah, where she was hospitalized
for 3 days.

Prior to working at Stouffer Foods, the Applicant had

been out of the work force for a considerable period of time.

On

the day of the accident, the Applicant had been up since 6:00 a.m.
that morning.

The doctor's notes indicated that the Applicant had

been awake for 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident.

5

In the hearing, Victoria Nelson, a Registered Nurse, employed
by Stouffer Foods for 7 years, testified that she knew of other
employees on another conveyor line who had become nauseous or light
headed.

Ms. Nelson testified that on the other conveyor line the

movement of the belt would make people light headed.

She stated

that many of the people who became light headed had been pregnant.
Ms. Nelson also testified that to her knowledge, no one had fainted
or had light headiness problems on the conveyor line in which the
Applicant had been working.
Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found the
Applicant had an abnormal EEC

However, it is not clear from the

medical records whether the abnormal EEG occurred as a result of
the fall or was present prior to the fall.
The Administrative Law Judge states that, "On December 7,
1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected that the fall was due
to a syncope based upon a generalized weakness due to resolving
bronchitis and possibly due to mild labyrinthitis exacerbated by
working on her feet at a moving conveyor belt all day."
3 of Order)

(See Page

The Industrial Commission also stated that Dr.

Colver's opinion of the cause of the fall was conjecture (See
Addendum E page 3).

However, what Dr. Colver stated was:

Syncope.
This is probably due to a
generalized weakness and working too hard on
her feet after getting over a bout of
bronchitis.
She may have also had some
6

labyrinthitis with some vertigo which could
have been exacerbated by the motion of the
conveyor belt. (Emphasis added) (See Addendum
A).
The Administrative Law Judge also failed to mention, and the
Industrial Commission ignored a letter from Dr. Colver, dated March
21, 1994, which was submitted by the Applicant.

Said letter

stated:
In response to your questions in the letter
dated March 12, 1994, you asked if my report
states that you had a inflammation of the
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter
from Mr. Keith F. Walquist, dated March 8,
1994, states: "also he reported that you had a
inflammation of the inner ear which could
cause vertigo11.
Mr. Walquist is misquoting me. My note dated
7-7-93, says that she may have also had some
labyrinthitis with some vertigo. Thus, I did
not say that you had an inflammation of the
inner ear, I merely hypothesized that it was
possible.
There is no way of knowing from my reports or
examination if you had a inflammation of the
inner ear prior to the accident.
I did feel the most likely cause of your
fainting was, "due to a generalized weakness
and working too hard on your feet after
getting over a bout of bronchitis".
My
records indicate that you had a cough from
which you were recovering when you went back
to work and had the accident...(Emphasis
added).
(See Addendum B)
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
also failed to give adequate consideration to a letter of December
7

14, 1993, from the Applicant's emergency room physician, Dr. L.
Dean Egbert.

Dr. Egbert states the following:

Mrs. Brunson is a 74 year old women that I saw
in the emergency department on 12-7-93, after
falling while working at a conveyor belt while
working at Stouffers. She had been working
there for only 2 days, she did not feel any
spinning sensation, simply became light
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor
sustaining a contusion of her brain. She was
admitted to the hospital. As far as I know,
no other specific cause of the blacking-out
episode was found. Considering the nature of
this work I think that the most likely cause
of her passing out was motion sickness due to
watching the conveyor belt go passed (sic)
her. (Emphasis added)
(See Addendum C)
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
also failed to give proper weight to the Summary of Medical Record
which

was

signed

neurosurgeon.

In

by

Dr.

said

John

R.

Clark,

Summary

of

Medical

the

Applicant's

Records,

it

is

specifically stated that there is a medically demonstrative causal
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems for
which she was treated.

(See Addendum D)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Commission ignored and disregarded competent, reliable and
credible evidence from the petitioner's treating physicians when it
found that the petitioner's industrial injury was caused by a preexisting condition rather than as a result of her fainting while
watching the conveyor belt.
8

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IGNORED COMPETENT, RELIABLE
AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
WHICH MEETS THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL PROBABILITY AS TO AN
INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT.
The Court of Appeals has authority to reverse the Industrial
Commission's Order.

(See U.C.A. §35-1-86).

The standard applied

by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the Industrial Commission's
Order is "substantial evidence".

(See Willardson vs. Industrial

Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993); King vs. Industrial
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993)).

"Substantial

evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(See Willardson vs.

Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993).
The Industrial Commission adopted the Administrative Law
Judge's Findings of Fact (See Addendum F page 1).

Thus, this

appeal includes issues covered in the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order.
The Industrial Commission arbitrarily disregarded competent
evidence when it affirmed the Administrative Law Judge and found
that the applicant had failed to establish medical causation.

In

Nicholson vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah
1964), the Supreme Court recognized the fact that it would not
9

disturb the findings or the order of the Commission if they were
supported by "substantial evidence".

However, at the same time

they recognized that the Supreme Court has a duty, particularly
with reference to the denial of compensation, to determine whether
the Commission has arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in
making its decision.
In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings, the last paragraph
on page three, it states:
A preponderance of evidence shows that Mrs.
Brunson's injury coincidentally occurred at
work because of her idiopathic condition
without any enhancement from the work place.
Although, there has been speculation about why
she had the fainting episode there is no
evidence which can be set-forth which meets
the
standard
of
a
reasonable
medical
probability. (See Addendum E)
"Medical

causation

demands

that

petitioner

'prove

(his)

disability is medically the result of a exertion or injury that
occurred during a work-related activity.'"
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986).

Allen vs. Industrial
"'The key question in

determining causation is whether given this body and this exertion,
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury.'" Stouffer Foods
Corp. vs. Industrial Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 182 (Utah App. 1990)
(quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 24).

In order to answer this question,

we must focus on what exertions by Petitioner are involved.

See

id.; Nyrehn vs. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah App.
10

1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Colver stated on
two occasions, that although, petitioner's physical condition was
weaker than usual, it was aggravated by, "...working too hard on
her feet..." and "...could have been exacerbated by the motion of
the conveyor belt".

In his clarifying letter of March 21, 1994,

Dr. Colver goes on to state in more definitive terms, "I do feel
the most likely cause of your fainting was, 'due to a generalized
weakness and working too hard on your feet after getting over a
bout a bronchitis'".

(emphasis added).

As also pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein, the
December 14, 1993, letter of L. Dean Egbert, M.D., the emergency
room physician, stated, also in definitive terms, his opinion of
the cause of the Applicant's injury.

He stated:

Considering the nature of this work, I think
the mostly likely cause of her passing out was
motion sickness due to watching the conveyor
belt go passed her. (emphasis added).
The Administrative Law Judge states in his Findings that there
was no evidence that had been set-forth which meets the standard of
a reasonable medical probability.

The definition of medical

probability, according to the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment, Fourth Edition,

page 318, is as follows:

Possibility.
Probabilityi
These are terms that
refer to the likelihood or chance that an
injury or illness was caused or aggravated by
11

a particular factor. "Possibility" sometimes
is used to imply a likelihood of less than
50%; "probability" sometimes is used to imply
likelihood of greater than 50%. (See Addendum
G).
The opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert both state, "the
most likely cause" of the Applicant's injury was due to working too
hard, being on her feet for extended period of time, and motion
sickness from watching the conveyor belt. The words, "most likely
cause" certainly indicate that, in their medical opinion, there is
more than a 50% likelihood that the of the cause of the accident
was the Applicant being on her feet for an extended period of time,
working too hard, and motion sickness from watching the conveyor
belt. Thus, both treating physicians opined that it was medically
probable that the cause of the accident was industrially related.
Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge ignored opinions of
reasonable medical probability from the two treating physicians
that the injury was in fact caused by conditions of the Applicant's
employment.

Dr. Clark's opinion that petitioner's injury was

directly related to an industrial accident compounds further the
evidence in favor of petitioner.
It is well established that if a pre-existing condition is
aggravated by working conditions, resulting in an injury, as long
as the activity which caused the injury was extraordinary in
nature, causation is established and workers compensation benefits
12

should be ordered.

(See Allen vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d

15 (Utah 1986)). Certainly, standing on one's feet for nine or more
hours watching a conveyor belt would be considered an extraordinary
activity. An ordinary 20th century person would not usually engage
in a similar exertion in everyday, nonindustrial life.

(See Allen

vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)).

As is set-

forth herein, the Applicant did not suffer from an idiopathic fall.
The Applicant was recovering from some pre-existing conditions, and
consequently, may have been in a weakened state.

However, as

stated by the opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert, it is more
than likely that the cause of the accident was the aggravation of
those pre-existing conditions by the long hours the Applicant was
working, standing on her feet the entire time and the motion
sickness that she incurred by watching the conveyor belt. This is
also supported by the testimony of Victoria Nelson, the Registered
Nurse

employed

by

Stouffer

Foods, who

testified

that

other

employees at Stouffer Foods had become nauseous and light headed by
watching the conveyor belt.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner requests that this Court find that the Commission,
in denying petitioner's application for benefits, arbitrarily
disregarded competent evidence in when it determined that the
petitioner's job-related-activities did not cause the industrial
13

accident.

There simply is no evidence to indicate otherwise.

Thus, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court enter an
Order reversing the Industrial Commission's Order in this matter.
DATED this J ^ day of July, 1995.

FREE
WAYNE A.. FREESTONE
Attorney for Applicant
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MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL
1000 East, U.S. Highway 6
Payson, Utah 84651
INTERNAL MEDICINE CONSULTATION REPORT
Name:
Hosp. #:
Date:

Brunson, Reba
01 36 75
12-7-93

Consulting Physician:
Referring Physician:

Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
John R. Clark, M.D.

CHIEF COMPLAINT:
This is a 75-year-old white female patient admitted by Dr. Clark
because of syncope and cerebral contusion.
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:
The patient recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or
sore throat from which she was recovering. She returned to her new
job working at a conveyer belt at Stouffer's yesterday evening and
after standing for almost her complete 8 hour shift she felt dizzy
and then fell backwards with apparent loss of consciousness and
struck the back of her head. She sustained a laceration and a
cerebral contusion.
Apparently
she had
no chest pain,
palpitations, or shortness of breath. It is unclear whether her
dizziness was vertigo or light headedness.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
1.

Partial thyroidectomy
therapy.

in

1973, now

on

chronic

2.

Appendectomy in 1967.

3.

Spinal meningitis without sequelae in 1958.

4.

Brief syncopal episode many years ago while in a shower after
getting over a cold.
faj

MEDICATIONS:

Synthroid, one pink pill per day.

ALLERGIES:

None known.

HABITS:

Ar\/

None.

SOCIAL HISTORY:
The patient is married and has a new job at Stouffer's.

EXHIBIT

Synthroid

fl

AM

Brunson, Reba
Consultation Report
Page 2 - Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS:
Otherwise negative except for significant hearing loss.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
General:

This is a sleepy white female with a left hearing aid.

HEENT:

Head:
Eyes:
Ears:
Throat:

Lungs:

She has a laceration on the back of her head.
The pupils are equal and round and respond to
light.
The tympanic membranes were difficult to
visualize due to narrow canals.
Clear.

Clear.

Cardiac: Normal SI and S2, 2/6 systolic murmur at the upper left
sternal border.
Abdomen:

Bowel sounds present
tender.

Extremities:
Neural:

The abdomen is soft and non-

Without cyanosis, clubbing or edema.

Mental status is alert and oriented. Cranial nerves II
through XII show decreased hearing, otherwise intact.
Motor strength is 4 to 5/5 in all extremities. Sensory:
She has light touch sensation in all extremities. Deep
tendon reflexes: There is a +2 left prepatellar and a
trace right prepatellar reflex. Babinski's are absent.

Laboratory:

EKG shows possible left anterior fascicular block,
otherwise normal. Chemistries include a glucose of
137, LDH 200. CBC: WBC 6.2, hematocrit 39.4. CBC
unremarkable.

IMPRESSION AND PLAN:

/t>«
Syncope. This is probably due to a generalized weakness and
1.
working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of
She may have also had some labyrinthitis with
,1'V d.-tV'fi Crf I ( v bronchitis.
some
vertigo
which
could have been exacerbated by the motion
to
lie. •
of
the
conveyer
belt.
There has been no arrhythmias rand no
f* \*
CS " / .
indication of other cause of syncope. The preliminary report
f^on the carotid ultrasound shows very trace left plaque and
A•
none on the' right. I would like to check some cardiac enzymes
* .
and also check the urinalysis. If these are negative, I do
Ml \
ft<:

t

'

fr

~ ','

4>t »
• ; • ! > •

1*

fi,

i* J*

f

Brunson, Reba
Consultation Report
Page 3 - Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
not feel strongly that any further for the workup for the
cause of syncope is indicated.
I do agree with the EEG as
already ordered by Dr. Clark.
21.

History of thyroidectomy.
QD.

Will resume her S>nthroid 0.2 mg

KEVIN J. COLVER, M.D.
Verified By Electronic Signature
KJC/cm
D/ 12-7-93
T/ 12-7-93

13:41
15:36
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Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
1120 East Highway 6, Suite 1
Payson, Utah 84651

March 21, 1994

Reva Brunson
91 South 200 East #4
Provo, Utah 84606
Dear Mrs, Brunson:
In response to your questions in the letter dated 12 March 1994r
you asked if my report states that you had inflammation of the
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter from Mr. Keith F.
Wahlquist dated 8 March 1994 states, "also he reported that you
had an inflammation of the inner ear which could cause vertigo."
Mr. Wahlquist is misquoting me. My note dated 7-7-93 says that,
"she may have also have some labyrinthitis with some vertigo."
Thus I did not say that you had an inflammation of the inner ear,
I merely hypothesized that this was possible.
There is no way of knowing from my reports or examination if you
did have inflammation of the inner ear prior to the accident.
I did feel the most likely cause of your fainting was, "due to a
generalized weakness and working too hard on her feet after
getting over a bout of bronchitis." My records indicate that you
had a cough from which you were recovering when you went back to
work and had the accident. The sentence in Mr. Wahlquists letter
which states, "Dr. Kevin Colver reported that your fainting was
probably due to your getting over a bout with bronchitis" is
acqurate.
Sincerely.

Kevin J . C o l v e r , M.D.
KJC/pj
EXHIBIT "B"

ADDENDUM C
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MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL
1000 East, U.S. Highway 6
Payson, Utah 84651

r ;.•'•*'

" ' . .

t

M .

<s ' y

December 14, 1993

To Whom It May Concern:
Re:

Reva Brunson

Attending Physicians:

John R. Clark, M.D.
Kevin J. Colver, M.D.

Mrs. Brunson is a 74-year-old woman that I saw in the Emergency
Department on 12-7-93 after falling while working at a conveyer
belt at Stouffer's. She had been working there for only two days.
She did not feel »• any spinning sensation, simply became light
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor sustaining a
contusion to her brain. She was admitted to the hospital. As far
as I know, no other specific cause of the blacking out episode was
found. Considering the nature of this work, I think that the most
likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to watching
the conveyer belt go past her.
Sincerely,
L. Dean Egbert, M.D.
Emergency Room Physician
Mountain View Hospital
LDE/cm
D/ 12-14-93
T/ 12-14-93

9:37
10:45

EXHIBIT "C"

!,«>»••
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x\evjLsea 7/93
Industrial Commission of Utah-Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
ft
(801)530-6800
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD
(to be completed by treating physician)
l\^i/Vu

EVALUATION FOR:.
DATE OF INJURY:

"7

ISrt^v^Srh.

\\a^

(?^jr

EMPLOYER

1. Has applicant been released for usual work? 4A? What date?_
2. Has applicant been released for light duty? A/O What date?_
3. Applicant was required to be off work from ~7 D ^ c tS to

fres^y**

4. Has applicant a permanent injury? A^ 7
5. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach
a final state of recovery?
6. If there is a permanaent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terms
of percentage of loss of function:
—
7. Is there a medicallly demonstrative casual relationship between the
industrial accident and the problems you have been treating? ^eJ Please
explain as necessary:
b Q«r~f~- C^G^ c^c^sj/<rv% a^r^T^i^j^C.
8. What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the
industrial accident?
^Mc>^r^T)Vv> oh C*s
9. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to
previously existing conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease
of congenital causes?
/*
10.What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from
all causes and conditions, including industrial injury?
11 Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existsing
condition? Please explain as necessary:
A^/'fy'
is * *- day of Arpri
Dated this

f
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Physician's.Name (please print)
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Physician's
Signature

Street Address
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Physician's Telephone Number
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 94-180
REVA BRUNSON,

*

Applicant,
vs.
STOUFFER FOODS CORP. and/or
TRAVELERS INSURANCE,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 3CO South, Salt Lake City, Utah on August
31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
The hearing was
pursuant ^o Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES j

The applicant, Reva Brunson,
represented herself pro se.

was

present

and

The defendant employer, Stouffer Foods, and its
insurer, Travelers Insurance, were represented by
Steven Aerchbacher, Attorney at Law.
The applicant, Reva Brunson, claims medical expenses and
temporary total disability. The applicant was initially scheduled
for a hearing on July 15, 1994. She has a profound hearing loss
and wears hearing aids.
Because her hearing aids were in for
repair, she was unable to ^ear the proceedings, and elected, after
considerable discussion, to delay the hearing until August 31,
1994.
On August 31, 1994, arrangements were made by Travelers
Insurance to have a stenographic reporter present who provided a
lap top computer by which the applicant could see on a computer
screen all of the discussion that transpired in the hearing room.
In addition, as back-up, the Industrial Commission provided a 20
inch computer screen by which typed questions could be shown to the
applicant.
The 20 inch screen was not necessary since the
applicant could adequate1a read on the lap top computer screen what
was transpiring during the session.
The defendants submitted an additional document on September
27, 1994, and the applicant submitted her response to it on
September 30, 1994. The rase was considered ready for an Order on
October 3, 1994.
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This case involves a fall at work. The 75 year old applicant,
who looks younger than her age, had been working for Stouffer Foods
(Stouffer) for only three days at the time of her injury. During
her work for Stouffer, her shift was from 3:00 o'clock p.m. to
11:00 p.m. She was getting less sleep than she normally got, and
although she had rested prior to going to work, her sleep pattern
had been disturbed. MR at 16. At the time of her injury, she
recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or sore throat
from which she was recovering. She was working overtime. Her job
was to stand next to a conveyer which transported frozen food and
to readjust boxes as they came down the conveyer belt. On the
night of the industrial incident, she had a meal break from 7:30 to
8:00 p.m. in the cafeteria.
At about 12:13 a.m., the applicant recited that she felt fine.
She had been standing during her shift, and during her overtime.
She looked up at the ceiling lights, and then at the boxes as they
moved along the conveyor belt. Sometime thereafter she stated that
she began to feel "light headed". ' She did not feel ill, nor did
she feel faint. She has no recollection of what happened, but she
fell backwards, hitting her head on the tile floor. She was placed
on a stretcher and transported to the Payson Hospital where she was
hospitalized for three days.
The applicant had previously worked as a supervising
seamstress. She had also worked for Carlisle Foods. After a long
period being out of the work force, she went to work for Stouffer.
Stouffer instructed all of its employees, including the applicant,
that if they were injured they were to go to see a company nurse,
and if they were feeling ill they were to tell a supervisor or
trainer.
On the day of this incident, the applicant had been up since
6:00 a.m. that morning.
The doctor's notes indicate that the
applicant had been awake for 20 hours at the time of the industrial
incident. Although the applicant denied that she had been up for
20 hours, from 6 a.m. to 12 midnight is 20 hours. The applicant
recited that she rested before she went to work. She claims that
her problem stemmed from a lack of carbohydrates and attributes her
fainting to lack of foods high in carbohydrates in Stouffer's
cafeteria, and the movement of the conveyor on which she adjusted
the food boxes.
The defendant employer provides free food to its employees,
but does not tell them what to eat. The employees may choose such
food items as they desire. Offered are entree items, salads,
cereals, snacks, breads, peanut butter, and normal food items
carried by cafeterias including numerous other carbohydrates. The
employer is not responsible for providing its employees food.

REVA BRUNSON
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The applicant was adamant at the hearing in expressing her
physical endurance and ability to work for extended periods of
time. In fact, subsequent to her injury, the applicant recited
that she had worked from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. in May 1994 for several
days moving heavy boxes from a storage area.
The applicant also asserted that her problem with fainting and
falling while at work at Stouffer was due to the fact that she had
an extra undershirt on, and that the additional clothing caused her
to get too warm.
Victoria Nelson, a registered nurse employed by Stouffer Foods
for seven years, testified that she has had other people on another
conveyor line who have become nauseous or light headed. On the
other conveyor line, the movement of the belt will make people
light headed. Many of the people who become light headed have been
pregnant. No one has had fainting or light headedness problems on
the conveyor line on which the applicant was working to the
knowledge of Ms. Nelson.
The applicant's conveyor line was
designed differently.
The applicant suffers from previously existing long standing
Hypacusis, and Hypothyroidism which is under control by replacement
medication. Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found an
abnormal EEC
He reported that some of the forms appear
"suspiciously epileptiform in character." MR at 49 & 8. It is not
clear from the medical records whether this abnormal EEG occurred
as a result of the fall, or was present prior to the fall.
On December 7, 1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected
that the fall was due to a syncope based upon a generalized
weakness due to resolving "bronchitis and possibly due to mild
labyrinthitis exacerbated by working on her feet at a moving
conveyor belt all day." MR at 53.
Dr. Clark gave her work releases through March 17, 1994. At
the time he released her to return to work on March 17, 1994, he
indicated that she had a post-concussion syndrome which was
subsiding, as well a slight left ulnar neuropathy. She told Dr.
Clark that she was afraid to return to work because she works swing
shift, and at this time of the evening she is most tired and does
not feel well. She claimed that if she could return to work during
the day shift that she could handle it because during the day she
is able to lift items and do her house work. MR at 19.
The preponderance of the evidence shows that Mrs. Brunson's
injury coincidentally occurred at work because of her idiopathic
condition without any enhancement from the workplace. Although
there has been speculation about why she had the fainting episode,
there is no evidence which has been set forth which meets the
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standard of a reasonable medical probability.
Prior to and at the time of her syncopal episode and fall,
Mrs. Brunson was not engaged in any activity which created any
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of her normal
nonemployment life or the normal nonemployment life of any other
person. Her syncopal episode and injury did not result from any
strain, exertion, or stress related to her employment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. Mrs. Brunson was not injured by accident arising out of
and in the course of her employment with her employer.
2.
Neither Mrs. Brunson's employment nor any activities
related thereto were the legal cause or medical cause of her
injury.
3.

The fall was related to a syncopal episode.

4. Mrs. Brunson is not entitled to workers' compensation
benefits as set forth in U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-1 et sea.
DISCUSSION:
The general rule concerning causation is that an employee
cannot recover for a physiological malfunction which is not
job-induced and which could have happened as easily away from work
as at work. Thus, in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo. 642 P.2d
722, 723-24 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court denied recovery for
a herniated disc caused by preexisting back problems from another
job, and which manifested itself when the employee engaged in
lifting activities which were not strenuous and could have happened
anywhere. Accord Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104
(Utah 1983); Farmers Grain Co-op. v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Ind. Comm'n
and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) ; see also Nuzum v. Roosendahl
Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977); Redman
Warehousing Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n. 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283
(Utah 1969).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a different rule applies,
however, where because of some non-occupational internal weakness
(such as a fainting spell), an employee falls and sustains an
injury from the fall. Kennecott v. Ind. Comm'n and Georgas, 675
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). The Court stated, however, that the Georgas
case did not present the question, and for that reason the Court
did not decide whether an idiopathic fall to level ground and
resulting injuries were compensable. Id. at FN 4. Compare, e.g..
Williams v. Ind. Comm'n, 38 111.2d 593, 232 N.E.2d 744 (1967)
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(recovery for fall to level floor denied), with Lovett v. Gore
Newspapers Co. , Fla., 419 So.2d 306 (1982) (recovery allowed). The
instant case presents the instance of a fall to a level tile floor.
It will be helpful to first review the statute germane to this
case. The Utah statute in effect at the time of the injury states
in pertinent part:
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment,
wherever such injury occurred,... shall be paid
compensation ....
U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-45 (1988).
The statute requires an accident "arising out of and in the
course of" employment. Id. (emphasis added). It is not sufficient
to have an injury which occurred ir) the course of employment, but
which did not arise out of the employment. There is no question,
but that the head injury occurred in the course of her employment.
However, the question based upon the facts of this case, is whether
the arising out of prong has been met.
The arising out of
requirement might be met out of the hardness of the tile floor as
an added employment hazard.
A. Larson, Law o f Workmen's
Compensation, Sect. 12.14(e)(1994). As Professor Larson discusses,
a china dish might survive if dropped on the kitchen linoleum, but
would not have a chance on the ceramic tile floor of a factory.
Of the five cases allowing a level-floor award, one involved
a tile floor (General Ins. Corp. V. Wichersham, 235 S.W.2d 215
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951), three involved a concrete floor (Smith v.
Container Gen. Corp., 559 So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1990); Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Comm'n, 41 Cal.2d 676, 263 P.2d 4
(1953); George v. Great Eastern Food Prod., 44 N.J. 44, 207 A.2d
161 (1965), and one involved a "hard wood" floor (Pollock v.
Studebaker Corp.. 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. App. 1951). These cases
indicate that the arising out of prong is satisfied by a physical
impact with a floor which was the immediate cause of the injury.
However, the great majority of cases deny recovery where the
injury occurred upon a tile or concrete floor because these types
of floors are common outside the work environment, and these types
of floors present risks which are not unique to work. See e.g. ,
Oldham v. Ind. Comm'n, 139 111. App. 3d 594, 93 111. Dec. 868, 487
N.E. 693 (1985)(the diagnosis was a transient loss of consciousness
of unknown etiology, and the necessity of standing and the presence
of a clay tile floor were not risks greater than those outside of
the employment).
In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to show
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that the injury arose out of the employment. There was no showing
that the applicant's employment posed a risk to her that was
greater than that to which she would be exposed as a member of the
general public. There are many homes and businesses which have
concrete and ceramic tile floors, and had she fainted in any of
them, her injury would have been as severe.
Under the
circumstances, as much as I would like to give her an award, there
is unfortunately no legal basis for recovery since the medical
evidence does not show by a preponderance that her fainting was
caused by her employment.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim filed by Reva Brunson for
injuries filed as a result of a fall on December 7, 1993 while
working on the premises of Stouffer Foods Corporation must be
dismissed with prejudice since it did not arise out of her
employment for Stouffer Foods Corporation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of
filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response
with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2).
DATED THIS / &L day of October 1994.
ilAL COMMISSIOJJ^F^dTAH
fjamjAi A. Sims" (/
'Administrative Law Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the / \
day of October, 1994, the
attached ORDER in the case of Reva Brtinson was mailed, postage prepaid to the following persons at the following addresses:
Reva^Brunson
91 S 200 E #4
Provo UT 84606
Steven Aeschbacher, Atty
PO Box 45385
SLC UT 84145-0385

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

4^1/1 ( o^x^A^ \^'

June S. Harrison, Paralegal
Aanudication Division
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
REVA BRUNSON,

*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*

STOUFFER FOODS CORPORATION and
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

*
*
*

*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case No. 94-0180

Defendants.
*

Reva Brunson asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review the
Administrative Law Judge's decision denying her claim for benefits
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over this
Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set
decision of the ALJ, summarized below.

forth in the

Ms. Brunson had worked at Stouffer Foods for only three days prior
to the accident in question. The accident occurred on December 7, 1993
while she was assigned to adjust packages of frozen food that passed by
on a conveyor belt. Without warning, she fainted and struck her head
on a tile floor.
As a result of the fall, Ms. Brunson suffered a
concussion and required overnight hospitalization.
Ms. Brunson can only speculate as to the cause of her fainting
spell. She has submitted a written statement from Dr. Colver that "the
most likely" cause of the incident was "a generalized weakness and
working too hard on your feet after getting over a bout of bronchitis."
She has also submitted a written statement of Dr. Egbert that "the most
likely" cause of her accident was "motion sickness due to watching the
conveyor belt go passed (sic) her." Finally, Dr. Clark states "there
is a medically demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial
accident and the problems for which (Ms. Brunson) was treated."
However, Dr. Clark provides no explanation of his conclusion.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms.
Brunson had failed to establish that her fainting and resulting injury
"arose out of and in the course of" her employment at Stouffer Foods.
The ALJ therefore held that her injury was not compensable under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation to
workers who are injured by accident "arising out of and in the course
of" their employment. (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45.) It is the worker's
burden to prove that his or her employment is both the medical and the
legal cause of injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 72 9 P. 2d 15
(Utah 1986). The focus of this case is on the requirement of medical
causation, which requires Ms. Brunson to prove that her work at
Stouffer Foods was the medical cause of her injury.
Ms. Brunson herself cannot explain why she fainted at work.
Likewise, her physicians' statements do not reveal any reasonable
medical certainty regarding the cause of her fainting. In fact, Dr.
Colver and Dr. Egbert arrive at two different conjectures to explain
the incident. Under these circumstances, the Commission agrees with
the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. Brunson has failed to establish medical
causation.
As noted above, it is Ms. Brunson's burden to prove medical
causation. Because she has not done so, the Commission must deny her
claim for workers' compensation benefits.
ORDER
The Commission affirms the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge and dismisses Ms. Brunson's Motion For Review. It is so ordered.
Dated this / ~)

day of February, 1995.

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
IMPORTANT!

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 days
of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this
Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review with
that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
REVIEW in the matter of Reva Brunson, Case No. 94-0180, was mailed,
first class, postage prepaid this / *? day of February, 1995, to the
following:
WAYNE A. FREESTONE
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER & HARDING, P.C.
BANK ONE TOWER
50 WEST 3 00 SOUTH, SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
STEVE J. AESCHBACHER
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
70 SOUTH MAIN STREET
P 0 BOX 45385
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0385
REVA BRUNSON
91 SOUTH 200 EAST #4
PROVO, UTAH 84606

Orders\94-0180

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on

day of July 1995, I caused to be

mailed by First-Class Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Motion For Review to the following:

Steven Aeschbacher, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on

day of July 1995, I caused to be

mailed by First-Class Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Motion For Review to the following:

Steven Aeschbacher, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
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Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment

5. Illness, Disease: An illness may be considered to be
the summation of the physical, mental, and other
kinds of factors that are involved in an individual's
less than optimal health status. A disease may be
considered to be the specific pathophysiologic
processes involved, which give rise to the individual's
signs and symptoms and their progression.'
6. Employ ability: This is the capacity of an individual
to meet the demands of a j o b and the conditions of
employment associated with that j o b as defined by an
employer, with or without accommodation.
7. Employability Determination: This is an assessment
by management of the individual's capacity, with or
without accommodation, to meet the demands of a
j o b and the conditions of employment. The management carries out an assessment of performance capability to estimate the likelihood of performance failure
and the likelihood of incurring liability in case of
human failure. If either likelihood is too great, then
the employer may not consider the individual employable in the j o b .
8. Medical Determination Related to Employability: This
is the process of evaluating the relationship of an
individual's health to the demands of a specific j o b
as described by the employer, such as demands for
performance, reliability, integrity, endurance, or
prolonged service. The physician must ensure that
the medical evaluation is complete and detailed
enough to draw valid conclusions with respect to the
individual's capability of meeting the job's demands
and carrying out essential j o b functions.
The physician's tasks are to (1) identify
impairments that could affect performance and determine whether or not the impairments are permanent; and (2) identify impairments that could lead
to sudden or gradual incapacitation, further impairment, injury, transmission of a communicable disease, or other adverse occurrence.
In estimating the risk factors, the physician should
indicate whether or not the individual represents a
greater risk to the employer than someone without
the same medical condition and should indicate the
limits of the physician's ability to predict the likelihood of an untoward occurrence.
9. Risk, Hazard: A risk represents the probability of an
adverse event; a risk must be weighed together with
the consequences of the adverse event. An individual's activities or characteristics, and biologic, physical,
or chemical factors, may increase the risk of morbidity or mortality.
A hazard is a potential source of danger, to a
woman contemplating crossing the Atlantic Ocean
in a rowboat, the Atlantic presents a serious hazard.
Excessive numbers of coliform bacteria or Shigella

dysentenae in the public water supply present a hazard
to a city.
10. Possibility, Probability .These are terms that refer
to the likelihood or chance that an injury or illness
was caused or aggravated by a particular factor.
"Possibility" sometimes is used to imply a likelihood
of less than 50%; "probability" sometimes is used
to imply a likelihood of greater than 50%.

Social Security Disability Determinations
Although the Social Security system predated the
first Guides edition and is not based on the Guides, a
description of the system is included here to compare
and contrast the ways in which medical information
is used under each approach.The Social Security
Administration (SSA) has national responsibility
under Public Law 74-271 for the administration of
both the Social Security disability insurance program
(title II) and the supplemental security income (SSI)
program (title XVI). Every person who pays into
Social Security contributes to the Social Security
Disability Trust Fund.
The title II program provides cash benefits to
disabled workers and their dependents who have
contributed to the trust fund through the FIGA tax
on their earnings. A person qualifies under the title
II program because of financial need. T h e title XVI
program provides for a minimum income for the
needy, aged, blind, and disabled. Under that program, financial need is indicated by limitation of
income and resources to a level that is equal to or less
than an amount specified in the law.

Definitions and Terms
Under the title II and title XVI programs, the definitions of disability are essentially the same. The law
defines disability as "the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that
can be expected to result in death or has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months (Section 223 [d] [1] [A]).
The law may apply to infants and children as well as
adults. In terms of the law, a person is either disabled
or not disabled.
To meet the definition of disability, an individual's impairment or combination of impairments must
be of such severity that he or she not only is unable
to do the work previously d o n e , but also cannot perform any other kind of substantial gainful work considering the individual's age, education, and work
experience (Section 223 [d] [2] [A]). Substantial
gainful work means any work that involves significant
and productive physical or mental activities and is

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on j j _ day of July 1995,1 caused to be mailed by First-Class
Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner/Appellant
Reva Brunson to the following:

Steven Aeschbacher, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Industrial Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
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